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Abstract—This paper presents a bi-level consumer-utility 
optimization model to schedule an energy consumption pattern of 
controllable loads in the face of a time varying price function 
depending on system conditions and market operations. The 
controllable loads are classified into three types based on their 
natures and operating characteristics for an upper-level 
consumer’s problem. To formulate the stochastic wind 
generators, a security-constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) 
model is proposed for a lower-level utility’s problem to consider 
various wind power scenarios. We then convert the bi-level model 
into a single-level of mathematical program with equilibrium 
constraints’ (MPECs) problem to obtain the optimal load 
scheduling results. Finally, a simple case study is conducted to 
demonstrate the feasibility of the method. 
 
Index Terms—Controllable loads, security-constrained 
optimal power flow (SCOPF), energy pricing, bi-level model, 
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPECs). 
I.  NOMENCLATURE 
A.  Indices 
t    time index 
i    generator index 
j    type I load index 
k    type II load index 
l    type III controllable load index 
B.  Set 
T    set of indices of time 
I    set of indices of generators 
J    set of indices of type I loads 
K    set of indices of type II loads 
L    set of indices of type III loads 
Ωj set of indices of allowed operating hours of type I 
loads 
Ωk set of indices of allowed operating hours of type II 
loads 
Ωl set of indices of allowed operating hours of type III 
loads 
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C.  Constant 
௝ܲூ    Rated power output of type I load j 
ܪ௝ூ    Total operating period of type I load j 
௞ܲூூ    Rated power output of type II load k 
݌௞ூூ   Minimum operating period of type II load k 
ݍ௞ூூ   Time constraint of type II load k 
ݐ௠௔௫  Maximum time index 
௟ܲ
ூூூ,௠௜௡ Minimum power output of type III load l 
௟ܲ
ூூூ,௠௔௫ Maximum power output of type III load l 
ܧ௟ூூூ,௠௜௡ Minimum energy consumption of type III load l 
ܥ௜,௧ Energy offer cost of generator i at period t 
ܥ௜,௧௎  Up-reserve offer cost of generator i at period t  
ܥ௜,௧஽  Down-reserve offer cost of generator i at period t  
ߨௌ   Probability of wind power scenario s 
௜ܲ
௚,௠௔௫   Maximum power output of generator i 
௜ܲ
௚,௠௜௡   Minimum power output of generator i 
௧ܲ஻௅    Baseload power at period t 
ܴ௜௎,௠௔௫   Maximum up-reserve provided by generator i 
ܴ௜஽,௠௔௫  Maximum down-reserve provided by generator i 
D.  Functions 
ܮ Lagrangian function of the lower-level utility’s 
problem 
E.  Continuous variables  
௝ܲ,௧ூ    Power output of type I load j at period t 
௞ܲ,௧ூூ   Power output of type II load k at period t 
௟ܲ,௧ூூூ  Power output of type III load l at period t 
ߤ௧    Marginal energy price at period t 
௜ܲ,௧
௚    Power output of generator i at period t 
ܴ௜,௧௎   Up-reserve scheduled by generator i at period t  
ܴ௜,௧஽   Down-reserve scheduled by generator i at period t  
ݎ௜,௧,௦௎   Up-reserve deployed by generator i at period t and 
scenario s 
ݎ௜,௧,௦஽   Down-reserve deployed by generator i at period t 
and scenario s 
ߣ௧,଴ Lagrange multiplier associated with the power 
balance equation at period t in market scheduling 
state 
ߣ௧,௦ Lagrange multiplier associated with the power 
balance equation at period t and scenario s 
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ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௔௫ Lagrange multiplier associated with the upper bound 
for the power output of generator i at period t in 
market scheduling state 
ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௜௡ Lagrange multiplier associated with the lower bound 
for the power output of generator i at period t in 
market scheduling state 
ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ Lagrange multiplier associated with the upper bound 
for the power output of generator i at period t and 
scenario s 
ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡ Lagrange multiplier associated with the lower bound 
for the power output of generator i at period t and 
scenario s 
ߙ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ Lagrange multiplier associated with the upper bound 
for the deployed up-reserve of generator i at period t 
and scenario s 
ߙ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡ Lagrange multiplier associated with the lower bound 
for the deployed up-reserve of generator i at period t 
and scenario s 
ߚ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ Lagrange multiplier associated with the upper bound 
for the deployed down-reserve of generator i at 
period t and scenario s 
ߚ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡ Lagrange multiplier associated with the lower bound 
for the deployed down-reserve of generator i at 
period t and scenario s 
ߜ௜,௧௠௔௫ Lagrange multiplier associated with the upper bound 
for the scheduled up-reserve of generator i at period 
t  
߭௜,௧௠௔௫ Lagrange multiplier associated with the upper bound 
for the scheduled down-reserve of generator i at 
period t  
F.  Binary variables 
ݔ௝,௧ூ  0/1 variable that is equal to 1 if type I load j is on 
and otherwise is equal to 0 at period t 
ݔ௞,௧ூூ  0/1 variable that is equal to 1 if type II load k is on 
and otherwise is equal to 0 at period t 
ݔ௟,௧ூூூ 0/1 variable that is equal to 1 if type III load l is on 
and otherwise is equal to 0 at period t 
G.  Random variables  
௧ܲ
௪,௦௖௛௘  Scheduled wind power generation at period t  
௧ܲ,௦௪  Wind power generation in period t and scenario s   
II.  INTRODUCTION 
RADITIONALLY, power balance is achieved by 
regulating a controllable generation to meet an inelastic 
demand. With increasing concern on climate change, 
renewable resources (primarily in wind energy) are more 
widely used in the electricity sector to reduce carbon 
emissions. Since renewables are intermittent, their power 
outputs are stochastic and difficult to predict accurately [1]. 
This introduces an immense challenge to facilitate power 
balance from only the generation sector. As such, demand 
response (DR) is also an effective method for utilities to help 
maintaining system reliability under contingencies [2]-[4].  
Sophisticated DR algorithms were proposed in a smart grid 
environment to schedule the consumption patterns of end-
users [5]-[8]. Du and Lu [5] proposed an appliance 
commitment to find an optimal schedule of thermostatically 
controlled appliances based on price and consumption 
forecasts. Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia [6] introduced an 
optimization framework to schedule the operation and energy 
consumption of residential appliances by minimizing the 
household’s electricity payment. Pedrasa et al [7] described a 
distributed energy resources scheduling algorithm to 
maximize the end user’s revenue in a smart home case study. 
Li et al [8] presented a DR approach based on utility 
maximization to operate different appliances including PHEVs 
and batteries. Although “smart” DR algorithms have been 
extensively proposed, those approaches generally neglected 
the relationship between demand sides and system conditions 
and formulated price signals as a predefined function which 
cannot reflect the dynamic nature of market operations.  
To formulate the production variability from renewable 
resources and the dynamic pricing for DR, we propose a bi-
level consumer-utility optimization model with a marginal 
electricity market price to schedule an optimal energy 
consumption pattern of controllable loads in the systems with 
stochastic wind generation.  
The upper level is a consumer’s problem which is assumed 
to be a leader. In the consumer’s problem, we classify the 
controllable loads into three types as shown in our previous 
work [9]. The objective of the consumer‘s problem is to 
minimize the electricity payment by scheduling its daily 
operation schedule based on the time-varying price signals. 
On the other hand, the lower level is a utility’s problem 
which use a multi-period security-constrained optimal power 
flow (SCOPF) model [10]-[13]. The SCOPF model is a 
scenario-based approach to formulate the stochastic wind 
power production into different discrete scenarios and 
enforces those scenarios in the power balance and power 
production constraints [12].  
Traditional approach for some electricity markets is to 
schedule energy and various reserve services in a sequential 
market-clearing procedure [14]-[16]. However, the 
interrelationship between energy and reserves services is so 
strong in the smart grid due to the highly volatile fluctuation 
of wind power outputs. Another approach which is called a 
simultaneously market-clearing procedure [17]-[19] is 
therefore used in this paper. The simultaneous market-clearing 
procedure mainly co-optimizes energy and reserve services in 
a coordinated manner. The SCOPF model is a typical one with 
this procedure and it simultaneously considers various market 
products such as energy, reserve capacity and actual reserve 
deployment in two states, namely market scheduling stare and 
actual operation state [10], [13]. With the SCOPF model and 
the market clearing procedure, the utility’s problem aims to 
determine the optimal level of energy and reserves with the 
consideration of controllable loads given by the consumer’s 
problem.  
Since this paper is not focus on pricing scheme of the 
SCOPF model, we simply use the marginal pricing scheme 
presented in [10] for the utility’s problem to make the proper 
economic signals to the consumer. The pricing scheme of the 
T
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SCOPF model mainly relies on the marginal approach [20] 
that uses Lagrangian multipliers on the power balance 
equations of both market scheduling and actual operation 
states to represent energy prices [13]. The marginal energy 
prices are derived from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
optimality conditions which are more realistic to reflect the 
opportunity costs of energy and reserve services in the high 
penetration of wind energy.      
Since the utility’s problem is continuous and convex, we 
can derive the KKT conditions of the lower-level utility’s 
problem as the equilibrium constraint in the upper-level 
consumer’s problem.  Therefore, the bi-level formulation is 
converted into a form of mathematical program with 
equilibrium constraints (MPECs) [21] which can be solved 
directly in GAMS [22].  
The bi-level formulation is commonly known as a 
“minimax” programming which optimizes two conflicting 
objectives with characterizing uncertainties into the different 
discrete scenarios [23]. On the other hand, another common 
stochastic programming such as chance-constrained approach 
uses probabilistic distributions to handle the stochastic 
variables, and therefore requires a Monte Carlo simulation to 
generate a large number of scenarios [24].  
Comparing with the chance-constrained approach, the 
“minimax” programming has the advantage of efficient 
computation because it can be solved deterministically without 
the need of Monte Carlo simulations. However, this “minimax” 
method may introduce an overly conservative procurement of 
reserve capacity in our problem since “low-wind” scenarios 
are more frequently occurred in practice. In contrast, the 
chance-constrained approach may accommodate a more 
versatile treatment of uncertainty in the constraints [25] but at 
meanwhile, a heuristic and complex solution algorithm is 
required to solve this approach.  
This paper is organized as follow. Section III formulates the 
proposed bi-level model. Section IV provides a solution 
approach of the problem. Section V gives a numerical 
example of the model and finally, some conclusions are drawn 
in Section VI. 
III.  BI-LEVEL CONSUMER-UTILITY SMART DISPATCH MODEL 
In this section, we provide a mathematical formulation of 
the bi-level consumer-utility model. The upper level is the 
consumer’s problem which aims to use controllable loads to 
minimize the payment. The utility’s problem is the SCOPF 
model for market clearing at the lower level.  
A.  Assumptions 
To focus on evaluating the impact of renewable sources on 
system operation, the only stochastic part in this paper is wind 
power output. In order words, the set of pre-specified actual 
operation states in the SCOPF model is various wind power 
scenarios. The market structure for the proposed model is 
assumed in a day-ahead market with the marginal pricing 
scheme. 
B.  Upper-level Consumer’s Problem 
The consumer obtains the hourly price signal from the 
utility and manages the energy consumption of three types of 
controllable loads in order to minimize the total electricity 
payment. The controllable loads are divided into three types 
according to their natures and operational characteristics. The 
mathematical formulation of the consumer’s problem is shown 
as follows: 
 
݉݅݊ ෍ ߤ௧ሺܦ௧ሻ
௧א்
ቌ෍ ௝ܲ,௧ூ
௝א௃
൅ ෍ ௞ܲ,௧ூூ
௞א௄
൅ ෍ ௟ܲ,௧ூூூ
௟א௅
ቍ (1) 
 
subject to 
    1)   Constraints of type I load: 
௝ܲ,௧ூ ൌ ݔ௝,௧ூ ௝ܲூ, ׊݆ א ܬ (2) 
෍ ݔ௝,௧ூ
௧א்
ൌ ܪ௝ூ, ׊݆ א ܬ (3) 
 
    2)   Constraints of type II load: 
௞ܲ,௧ூூ ൌ ݔ௞,௧ூூ ௞ܲூூ, ׊݇ א ܭ (4) 
ݔ௞,௧ூூ ൅ ݔ௞,௧ାଵூூ ൅ ڮ ൅ ݔ௞,௧ା௤ೖ಺಺
ூூ ൒ ݌௞ூூ, ׊݇ א ܭ, ׊ݐ
ൌ 1,2, … , ݐ௠௔௫ െ ݍ௞ூூ 
(5) 
 
    3)   Constraints of type III load: 
ݔ௟,௧ூூூ ௟ܲூூூ,௠௜௡ ൑ ௟ܲ,௧ூூூ ൑ ݔ௟,௧ூூ ௟ܲூூூ,௠௔௫, ׊݈ א ܮ (6) 
൭෍ ௟ܲ,௧ூூூ
௧א்
൱ ∆ݐ ൒ ܧ௟ூூூ,௠௜௡ (7) 
 
    4)  Operating period constraints: 
ቊݔ௝,௧
ூ א ሼ0,1ሽ|ݐ א Ω௝
ݔ௝,௧ூ ൌ 0|ݐ ב Ω௝ , ׊݆ א ܬ 
(8) 
ቊݔ௞,௧
ூூ א ሼ0,1ሽ|ݐ א Ω௞
ݔ௞,௧ூூ ൌ 0|ݐ ב Ω௞ , ׊݇ א ܭ 
(9) 
ቊݔ௟,௧
ூூூ א ሼ0,1ሽ|ݐ א Ω௟
ݔ௟,௧ூூூ ൌ 0|ݐ ב Ω௟ , ׊݈ א ܮ 
(10) 
 
The objective function of the consumer is to minimize the 
total electricity payment as shown in (1). We use a time-
varying price function ߤ௧ሺܦ௧ሻ which depends on the aggregate 
consumption level ܦ௧  to model a dynamic electricity price. 
The detailed derivation of this price function in terms of 
system conditions will be given in Section III-D.  
Type I load is defined as a load which consumes fixed 
amount of total energy consumption per day. Some typical 
examples of type I loads are water pump, dish washer, 
washing machine and electric vehicle charging. Equation (2) 
imposes that type I load is a single-mode appliance. It can be 
on and off arbitrary within the day but the fixed energy has to 
be applied before the last allowed operating hour as shown in 
(3). 
The operation of a type II load is similar to the type I load, 
but with time constraints in continuous time periods. For 
example, a refrigerator can be temporally switched off when 
the electricity price is high. However, it cannot be turned off 
more than few hours (e.g. 2 hours) in order to keep the food 
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fresh. Some other typical appliances are freezer, water heater 
and air conditioner. The type II load is formulated as a single-
mode appliance as shown in (4). Equation (5) ensures that 
some energy has to be given to the type II load constrained 
with the time limit ݍ௞ூூ.  
A type III load mainly includes the cooking and 
entertainment appliances which consume flexible amount of 
energy over the entire day as shown in (6). To ensure 
maintaining certain comfortability to customers, a minimum 
energy is required to be given within the schedule period as 
shown in (7). 
 Equations (8)-(10) impose operating period constraints of 
different types of controllable loads. To increase the control 
flexibility from the demand sector, the consumer is required to 
input the set of allowed operating hours of controllable loads. 
For the hours that excludes in the set, the corresponding 
decision variables are forced to 0 (i.e. off).  
C.  Lower-level Utility’s Problem 
The utility’s problem is modeled as the multi-period 
SCOPF model. The SCOPF model consists of two states, 
namely market scheduling and actual operation states. The 
energy and reserve capacities are simultaneously scheduled in 
both states. The objective of the utility’s problem is to 
minimize the expected cost (EC) in a day-ahead market as 
shown in (11): 
݉݅݊ܧܥ ൌ ݉݅݊ ൝෍ ෍ ܥ௜,௧ ௜ܲ,௧௚
௜אூ௧א்
൅ ෍ ෍൫ܥ௜,௧௎ ܴ௜,௧௎ ൅ ܥ௜,௧஽ ܴ௜,௧஽ ൯
௜אூ௧א்
൅ ෍ ߨௌ ෍ ෍ ܥ௜,௧൫ݎ௜,௧,௦௎ െ ݎ௜,௧,௦஽ ൯
௜אூ௧א்௦אௌ
ቋ 
(11) 
                      
The objective function is subject to following constraints: 
    1)  Power balance constraints: 
          a)  Market scheduling states 
෍ ௜ܲ,௧௚
௜אூ
൅ ௧ܲ௪,௦௖௛௘ ൌ ෍ ௝ܲ,௧ூ
௝א௃
൅ ෍ ௞ܲ,௧ூூ
௞א௄
൅ ෍ ௟ܲ,௧ூூூ
௟א௅
൅ ௧ܲ஻௅ ׷ ሺߣ௧,଴ሻ, ׊ݐ א ܶ 
(12) 
 
          b)  Actual operation states: 
෍ ௜ܲ,௧௚
௜אூ
൅ ෍ ݎ௜,௧,௦௎
௜אூ
െ ෍ ݎ௜,௧,௦஽
௜אூ
൅ ௧ܲ,௦௪
ൌ ෍ ௝ܲ,௧ூ
௝א௃
൅ ෍ ௞ܲ,௧ூூ
௞א௄
൅ ෍ ௟ܲ,௧ூூூ
௟א௅
൅ ௧ܲ஻௅ ׷ ሺߣ௧,௦ሻ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ 
(13) 
 
    2)  Power production constraints: 
          a)  Market scheduling states 
௜ܲ
௚,௠௜௡ ൑ ௜ܲ,௧௚ ൑ ௜ܲ௚,௠௔௫ ׷ ሺߛ௜,௧,଴௠௜௡, ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௔௫ሻ, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ
א ܶ (14) 
 
          b)  Actual operation states: 
௜ܲ,௧
௚ ൅ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܷ ൑ ௜ܲ௚,௠௔௫ ׷ ሺߛ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ሻ, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ
א ܵ (15) 
௜ܲ
௚,௠௜௡ ൑ ௜ܲ,௧௚ െ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܦ ׷ ሺߛ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡ሻ, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (16) 
 
    3)  Constraints linking reserve capacities 
0 ൑ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܷ ൑ ܴ௜,௧௎ ׷ ሺߙ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡, ߙ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ሻ, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ
א ܵ (17) 
0 ൑ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܦ ൑ ܴ௜,௧஽ ׷ ሺߚ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡, ߚ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ሻ, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ
א ܵ 
(18) 
ܴ௜,௧௎ ൑ ܴ௜௎,௠௔௫ ׷ ሺߜ௜,௧௠௔௫ሻ, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (19) 
ܴ௜,௧஽ ൑ ܴ௜஽,௠௔௫ ׷ ሺ߭௜,௧௠௔௫ሻ, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (20) 
 
The utility’s objective function to be minimized as shown in 
(11) consists of following five terms: 
• The first term is the energy production cost.  
• The second and third terms are the offered costs of 
generators for scheduling up- and down-reserve. The up- 
and down-reserve are used to accommodate the 
unexpected fluctuations of wind power. The up-reserve is 
defined as a reserve capacity which schedules for a 
sudden lack of power output such as unexpected decrease 
of wind generators’ output [10]. On the other hand, the 
down-reserve is scheduled to absorb a sudden increase of 
power output such as unexpected wind power spillage. 
The consideration of down-reserve can help to reduce a 
switching of generators.  
• The last two terms are the costs of up- and down–reserve 
deployed by generators in the actual operation state. Since 
the actual operation state consists of a set of wind power 
scenarios, the last two terms are associated with the 
probability of each pre-specified wind power output. It 
should be noted that the deployment of down-reserve can 
reduce the cost as shown in the fifth term in (11).  
For simplicity, network constraints are ignored and the 
utility’s problem in this paper only focuses on power balance. 
The power balances in the market scheduling and actual 
operation states are shown in (12) and (13), respectively. The 
approximate wind power is first forecasted in the market 
scheduling state.  
Equation (14) shows the power production limits in market 
scheduling states. Equations (15) and (16) relate the up- and 
down-reserve limitations to the power outputs produced in the 
actual operation states, respectively.  
Equations (17) and (18) impose the bounds of the deployed 
up- and down-reserve, respectively. From (17) and (18), it is 
noted that the upper bounds of deployed down- and up-reserve 
are actually the scheduled up- and down-reserve. Finally, (19) 
and (20) shows the upper limits of scheduled up- and down-
reserve, respectively. The Lagrange multipliers associated 
with equations (12)-(20) are given in corresponding 
parentheses. It should be noted that all the Lagrange 
multipliers are non-negative numbers.  
D.  Dynamic Pricing Scheme 
The time-varying price function ߤ௧ሺܦ௧ሻ plays a key role to 
link the consumer’s problem with the utility’s problem. To 
explicitly represent system conditions in this function, we 
propose to use the marginal pricing scheme to provide 
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economic signals to the consumer. This can be achieved by 
deriving a relationship between ߤ௧ሺܦ௧ሻ  and the Lagrange 
multipliers of the power balance constraints in both market 
scheduling and actual operation states.  
The Lagrange multipliers in (12) and (13) are also 
commonly known as Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) [26] 
and they embody the energy prices which can serve the 
consumer as market incentives. However, the marginal pricing 
scheme for the SCOPF model involves a complex pricing 
issue which is out of scope in this paper. As such, we simply 
use the energy pricing schemes as derived in the Appendix of 
[10] to derive the time-varying price function ߤ௧ሺܦ௧ሻ in terms 
of the LMPs and the result is given as follows: 
 
ߤ௧ሺܦ௧ሻ ൌ ߣ௧,଴ ൅ ෍ ߣ௧,௦
௦אௌ
 (21) 
  
Equation (21) states that the marginal energy price in the 
SCOPF model is a marginal cost of satisfying the power 
balance equations in both marketing scheduling state (12) and 
actual operation state (13). Since reserves are to maintain 
system security for different possible actual operation states, 
∑ ߣ௧,௦௦אௌ should be included in the marginal energy price to 
denote the marginal cost of security [10], [11].  
To verify the physical meaning of (21), we first derive the 
marginal energy cost from the KKT conditions in the utility’s 
problem as shown in (22) 
 
߲ܮ
߲ ௜ܲ,௧௚
ൌ ܥ௜,௧ െ ൫ߣ௧,଴ െ ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௔௫ ൅ ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௜௡൯
െ ෍൫ߣ௧,௦ െ ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ ൅ ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡൯
௦ఢௌ
ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ 
(22) 
 
Given the marginal energy price as defined in (21), we can 
deduce the following relationship 
 
ߤ௧ሺܦ௧ሻ ൌ ܥ݅,ݐ ൅ ൫ߛ݅,ݐ,0݉ܽݔ െ ߛ݅,ݐ,0݉݅݊൯
൅ ෍൫ߛ݅,ݐ,ݏ݉ܽݔ െ ߛ݅,ݐ,ݏ݉݅݊൯
ݏ߳ܵ
, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (23) 
 
From (23), it can be seen that the marginal energy price is 
also equivalent to the sum of three terms. The first term is the 
energy offer cost. The second and third terms are associated 
with the Lagrange multipliers of generation limits in market 
scheduling and actual operation states, respectively. Therefore, 
the price given in (21) is physically consistent with (23) and it 
can fulfill the common requirement for the marginal pricing 
[20].  
IV.  SINGLE-LEVEL EQUIVALENT  
A.  MPEC Reformulation 
To solve the proposed bi-level model, we have to derive the 
first order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions 
of the lower-level utility’s problem as the equilibrium 
constraints in the upper-level consumer’s problem [21]. The 
bi-level model is then converted to the MPECs’ problem. The 
derivation of the KKT conditions is applicable since the 
decision variables of lower-level utility’s problem are 
continuous and therefore, the utility’s problem is convex. Also, 
the binary variables which appear in the power balance 
constraints as shown in (12) and (13) can be regarded as 
parameters to the utility’s problem.  
Therefore, the original bi-level problem (1)-(20) is 
converted into the MPECs’ problem: 
 
݉݅݊ ෍ ߤ௧ሺܦ௧ሻ
௧א்
ቌ෍ ௝ܲ,௧ூ
௝א௃
൅ ෍ ௞ܲ,௧ூூ
௞א௄
൅ ෍ ௟ܲ,௧ூூூ
௟א௅
ቍ (24) 
 
subject to 
 
௝ܲ,௧ூ ൌ ݔ௝,௧ூ ௝ܲூ, ׊݆ א ܬ (25) 
෍ ݔ௝,௧ூ
௧א்
ൌ ܪ௝ூ, ׊݆ א ܬ (26) 
௞ܲ,௧ூூ ൌ ݔ௞,௧ூூ ௞ܲூூ, ׊݇ א ܭ (27) 
ݔ௞,௧ூூ ൅ ݔ௞,௧ାଵூூ ൅ ڮ ൅ ݔ௞,௧ା௤ೖ಺಺
ூூ ൒ ݌௞ூூ, ׊݇ א ܭ, ׊ݐ
ൌ 1,2, … , ݐ௠௔௫ െ ݍ௞ூூ 
(28) 
ݔ௟,௧ூூூ ௟ܲூூூ,௠௜௡ ൑ ௟ܲ,௧ூூூ ൑ ݔ௟,௧ூூ ௟ܲூூூ,௠௔௫, ׊݈ א ܮ (29) 
൭෍ ௟ܲ,௧ூூூ
௧א்
൱ ∆ݐ ൒ ܧ௟ூூூ,௠௜௡ (30) 
ቊݔ௝,௧
ூ א ሼ0,1ሽ|ݐ א Ω௝
ݔ௝,௧ூ ൌ 0|ݐ א Ω௝ , ׊݆ א ܬ 
(31) 
ቊݔ௞,௧
ூூ א ሼ0,1ሽ|ݐ א Ω௞
ݔ௞,௧ூூ ൌ 0|ݐ א Ω௞ , ׊݇ א ܭ 
(32) 
ቊݔ௟,௧
ூூூ א ሼ0,1ሽ|ݐ א Ω௟
ݔ௟,௧ூூூ ൌ 0|ݐ א Ω௟ , ׊݈ א ܮ 
(33) 
෍ ௜ܲ,௧௚
௜אூ
൅ ௧ܲ௪,௦௖௛௘ ൌ ෍ ௝ܲ,௧ூ
௝א௃
൅ ෍ ௞ܲ,௧ூூ
௞א௄
൅ ෍ ௟ܲ,௧ூூூ
௟א௅
൅ ௧ܲ஻௅, ׊ݐ א ܶ 
(34) 
෍ ௜ܲ,௧௚
௜אூ
൅ ෍ ݎ௜,௧,௦௎
௜אூ
െ ෍ ݎ௜,௧,௦஽
௜אூ
൅ ௧ܲ,௦௪
ൌ ෍ ௝ܲ,௧ூ
௝א௃
൅ ෍ ௞ܲ,௧ூூ
௞א௄
൅ ෍ ௟ܲ,௧ூூூ
௟א௅
൅ ௧ܲ஻௅, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ 
(35) 
௜ܲ
௚,௠௜௡ ൑ ௜ܲ,௧௚ ൑ ௜ܲ௚,௠௔௫, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (36) 
௜ܲ,௧
௚ ൅ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܷ ൑ ௜ܲ௚,௠௔௫, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (37) 
௜ܲ
௚,௠௜௡ ൑ ௜ܲ,௧௚ െ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܦ , ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (38) 
0 ൑ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܷ ൑ ܴ௜,௧௎ , ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (39) 
0 ൑ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܦ ൑ ܴ௜,௧஽ , ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (40) 
ܴ௜,௧௎ ൑ ܴ௜௎,௠௔௫, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (41) 
ܴ௜,௧஽ ൑ ܴ௜஽,௠௔௫, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (42) 
ܥ௜,௧ െ ൫ߣ௧,଴ െ ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௔௫ ൅ ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௜௡൯
െ ෍൫ߣ௧,௦ െ ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ ൅ ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡൯
௦ఢௌ
ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ 
(43) 
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ܥ௜,௧௎ െ ෍ ߙ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫
௦ఢௌ
൅ ߜ௜,௧௠௔௫ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (44) 
ܥ௜,௧஽ െ ෍ ߚ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫
௦ఢௌ
൅ ߭௜,௧௠௔௫ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (45) 
ߨ௦ܥ௜,௧ െ ߣ௧,௦ ൅ ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ െ ߙ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡ ൅ ߙ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ ൌ 0, ׊݅
א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (46) 
െߨ௦ܥ௜,௧ ൅ ߣ௧,௦ ൅ ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡ െ ߚ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡ ൅ ߚ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ ൌ 0, ׊݅
א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (47) 
ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௔௫ ൒ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (48) 
ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௜௡ ൒ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (49) 
ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ ൒ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (50) 
ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡ ൒ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (51) 
ߙ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ ൒ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (52) 
ߙ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡ ൒ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (53) 
ߚ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫ ൒ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (54) 
ߚ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡ ൒ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (55) 
ߜ௜,௧௠௔௫ ൒ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (56) 
߭௜,௧௠௔௫ ൒ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (57) 
ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௔௫൫ ௜ܲ௚,௠௔௫ െ ௜ܲ,௧௚൯ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (58) 
ߛ௜,௧,଴௠௜௡൫ ௜ܲ,௧௚ െ ௜ܲ௚,௠௜௡൯ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (59) 
ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫൫ ௜ܲ௚,௠௔௫ െ ௜ܲ,௧௚ െ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܷ ൯ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ
א ܵ (60) 
ߛ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡൫ ௜ܲ,௧௚ െ ௜ܲ௚,௠௜௡ െ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܦ ൯ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ
א ܵ (61) 
ߙ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫൫ܴ௜,௧௎ െ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܷ ൯ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (62) 
ߙ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡൫ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܷ ൯ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (63) 
ߚ௜,௧,௦௠௔௫൫ܴ௜,௧஽ െ ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܦ ൯ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (64) 
ߚ௜,௧,௦௠௜௡൫ݎ݅,ݐ,ݏܦ ൯ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ, ׊ݏ א ܵ (65) 
ߜ௜,௧௠௔௫൫ܴ௜௎,௠௔௫ െ ܴ௜,௧௎ ൯ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (66) 
߭௜,௧௠௔௫൫ܴ௜஽,௠௔௫ െ ܴ௜,௧஽ ൯ ൌ 0, ׊݅ א ܫ, ׊ݐ א ܶ (67) 
 
 Equations (24)-(33) are consistent with the original upper-
level consumer’s problem as shown in (1)-(10). Equations 
(34)-(67) represent the KKT optimality conditions of the 
lower-level utility’s problem (14)-(23). Equations (34)-(42) 
represents The primal constraints, dual constraints and 
complementarity slackness conditions are given in equations 
(34)-(42), (43)-(57) and (58)-(67), respectively.  
V.  CASE STUDY 
To test the proposed bi-level model, we conduct a 
numerical example of twelve hourly periods (i.e.  
ݐ ൌ 1,2, … ,12) to schedule the controllable loads with data 
presented in Table I-VI. Table I-III show the data of type I, II 
and III loads, respectively. Since an individual appliance is 
small in terms of demand and consumed energy. We assume 
that the data in Table I-III are an aggregated value of hundred 
appliances for meaningful comparison in the example. Table 
IV lists the data of the generators. For the sake of simplicity, 
the energy and reserve offers of each generator are consistent 
throughout the whole scheduled period. We consider three 
wind power scenarios as shown in Table V. The probabilities 
of scheduled, high and low wind profiles are 0.6, 0.2 and 0.2 
respectively. Table VI shows the hourly demand profile.  
        
TABLE I  
TYPE I LOAD DATA 
Load j 1 
௝ܲூ (MW) 4 
ܪ௝ூ 5 
 
TABLE II 
TYPE II LOAD DATA 
Load k 1 
௞ܲூூ (MW) 2.5 
݌௞ூூ 1 
ݍ௞ூூ 2 
 
TABLE II 
TYPE III LOAD DATA 
Load l 1 
௟ܲ
ூூூ,௠௜௡ (MW) 0 
௟ܲ
ூூூ,௠௔௫ (MW) 5 
ܧ௟ூூூ,௠௜௡ (MWh) 10 
 
TABLE IV  
GENERATOR DATA 
Generator i 1 2 3 
௜ܲ
௚,௠௜௡ (MW) 10 10 10 
௜ܲ
௚,௠௔௫ (MW) 30 40 80 
ܥ௜,௧ ($/MWh) 20 30 40 
ܥ௜,௧௎  ($/MWh) 5 4 3.5 
ܥ௜,௧஽  ($/MWh) 5 4 4.5 
ܴ௜௎,௠௔௫ (MW) 15 30 10 
ܴ௜஽,௠௔௫ (MW) 15 30 20 
 
TABLE V 
WIND POWER SCENARIOS 
Period t 
௧ܲ,௦௪  (MW) in scenario s 
s = 1 
(Scheduled) 
s = 2 
(High) 
s = 3 
(Low) 
1 10 20 5 
2 15 30 10 
3 8 18 3 
4 9 13 8 
5 18 21 15 
6 8 9 6 
7 9 10 7 
8 12 22 5 
9 10 18 9 
10 6 9 4 
11 5 6 2 
12 14 15 11 
 
TABLE VI 
BASELOAD POWER 
Period t 1 2 3 4 5 6 
௧ܲ஻௅(MW) 90 100 80 100 90 40 
t 7 8 9 10 11 12 
௧ܲ஻௅(MW) 100 70 80 100 90 50 
 
Without considering the scheduling of controllable loads, a 
base case is created to benchmark the optimal results from the 
proposed model. Given the same set of data and without the 
consideration of operating period constraints in the 
consumer’s problem, Table VI shows the energy price and the 
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results in the consumer’s problem for base and optimal cases. 
The results under columns “B” and “O” are given by the base 
case and the optimal load scheduling, respectively.  
From Table VI, the average energy price and the total 
electricity payment for the base case is calculated as 
$34.6/MWh and $1594/h, respectively. Both of them are more 
costly than the optimal results which are calculated as 
$32.6/MWh and $989.8.8/h. 
 
TABLE VI  
COMPARISON OF ENERGY PRICE AND DISPATCH RESULTS OF CONSUMER 
t Energy price ߤ௧ ($/MWh) 
Type I 
ݔଵ,௧ூ  
Type II 
ݔଵ,௧ூூ  
Type III 
ݔଵ,௧ூூூ 
 B O B O B O B O 
1 40 35.7 1 0 1 0 1 (5MW) 0 
2 38.5 38.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 30 31.5 0 1 0 1 0 0 
4 40 40 1 0 1 0 1 (5MW) 0 
5 30 30 0 1 0 0 0 0 
6 40 20 1 1 0 1 0 1 (5MW) 
7 40 40 0 0 1 0 0 0 
8 27 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 30 30 0 1 0 1 0 0 
10 40 40 1 0 1 0 0 1 
11 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.5MW) 
12 20 20 0 1 0 1 0 1 (4.5MW) 
  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented a bi-level consumer-utility 
optimization model with marginal electricity market price to 
schedule an energy consumption pattern of controllable loads. 
We classified controllable loads into three types based on their 
natures and operating characteristics for an upper-level 
consumer’s problem. We further integrated these load models 
with a stochastic-constrained optimal power flow model for 
considering stochastic wind power outputs at the lower-level 
utility’s problem. We then converted the bi-level model into a 
single-level of mathematical program with equilibrium 
constraints’ problem to obtain the optimal load scheduling 
results. We finally applied the proposed model to a simple 
case study to demonstrate the feasibility of the method. 
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